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Introduction: 
 
In reference to the planes that crashed into the Twin Towers on September 11th, 2001, 
Jean Baudrillard (2002, 5) said the following: “The fact that we have dreamed of this event, 
that everyone without exception has dreamt of it – because no one can avoid dreaming of the 
destruction of any power that has become hegemonic to this degree – is unacceptable to the 
Western moral conscience.” To be clear, what is unacceptable to the Western moral 
conscience is that ‘we’ dreamed it and yet Baudrillard insists that ‘we’/everyone did; it could 
not be otherwise. Here Baudrillard presents us with a truth claim that cannot be verified 
because it must be denied even to ourselves. It is an unconscious truth/the stuff of dreams. 
These are the facts. 
 
From a social scientific point of view, this quote baffles and yet this paper will argue 
that an interrogation of this quote and Baudrillard’s logic may offer us valuable insights into 
the politics of knowing and un-knowing associated with the ‘war on terror.’ This article is 
interested in the question of how it came to be that post 9/11, the seemingly most powerful 
and secure on the planet came to be identified as subjects of terror/trauma within the context 
of a global war (otherwise known as the ‘war on terror’). But, even more tellingly and 
related to Baudrillard’s quote, this paper is interested in the ‘(un)consciousness of risk’ that 
preceded the attacks such that we can meaningfully make sense of Baudrillard’s claim that 
the attacks were in some sense anticipated2 – even if only at the recesses of consciousness.  
 
1 Many thanks to Victoria Browne, Gary Browning, Chris Hesketh, Veronique Pin-Fat, Doerthe Rosenow, the 
journal editors and the reviewers of this article for the feedback and encouragement you provided along the 
way. I am indebted. 
2 The specific question of whether the events of 9/11 were also desired is beyond the scope of this paper – 
except to say that, of course, bodies were differentially aligned with and against hegemonic configurations of 
power – often in complex and contradictory ways. 
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What were the conscious, semi-conscious and unconscious avowals and disavowals that 
marked the contours of a re-emergent, if vulnerable, ‘West,’ as ‘a community at risk’ in the 
period preceding the attacks and that has shaped understandings of risk and the ‘war on 
terror’ since? Baudrillard’s quote is invoked as a provocation – one that will be used first to 
unsettle contemporary understandings of risk and the ‘war on terror’ and then to investigate 
the power relations that structure both the conscious and unconscious experiences and daily 
forms of knowing and un-knowing that give meaning to and invigorate articulations of risk. 
To be clear, foreboding knowledge as related to Western vulnerability in the context 
of the ‘war on terror,’ has been the subject of investigation in the social sciences, particularly 
in the literature on risk and precautionary risk stemming from Ulrich Beck’s (1999) World 
Risk Society thesis. Beck has directed our attention to change at the level of ontology – or the 
contemporary structural features of our globalized and post-industrial world – and the 
emerging consciousness and/or rationalities that follow, including consciousness of the 
changing nature of risk. As will be discussed, others have adapted this to understand early 
efforts to make sense of the 9/11 attacks and the ‘war on terror’ to follow – in light of risk 
consciousness and precautionary risk rationalities. What is absent, in relation to Baudrillard’s 
provocative statement, is any sustained engagement with what might be called ‘the stuff of 
dreams’ – which, for the purposes of this paper, refers to the desires or the 
conscious/unconscious/semi-conscious disavowals that are formative of an emerging risk 
consciousness and/or rationality and any ‘we’ who might (really and/or imaginatively) hold 
these in common. Arguably, these are outside of the social sciences frame and for good 
reason – as they are hard to objectively document and quantify. However, if the aim of the 
social scientific project is neither to distort, nor to reify the ontology, vocabularies and 
rationalities of the powerful – i.e., if the aim is not to displace ‘the work’ of anxieties and 
desires within a frame reason/rationality, extending a particular temporal and spatial logic of 
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‘the West’ as reason/transcendence in the process - we must think anew about what and how 
 
we see and consider the tools we have for doing so. This is my argument. 
 
To make this case, this article will first point to the limits of contemporary risk 
approaches towards making sense of the terrorized, traumatized Western liberal subject, i.e.: 
the subject of/at risk. Second, it will propose an alternative methodological approach - 
drawing upon postcolonial and feminist International Relations (IR) scholarship, critical race 
studies and critical phenomenology to better identify the power relations that structure both 
the conscious and unconscious experiences and daily forms of knowing and un-knowing that 
give meaning to and invigorate articulations of risk. Third, and following from above, it will 
outline an alternative genealogical account of the terrorized, traumatized Western liberal 
subject – one that highlights contingency, power relations, and the formative disavowals that 
enable and sustain contemporary configurations of risk, its subjects and the ‘war on terror’ 
waged in their name. 
 
Risk and the ‘War on Terror’: 
 
Engagements with questions of ‘Western’ consciousness of contemporary risk – if not 
a sense of foreboding - would be remiss without some reference to the work of Beck’s (1999) 
World Risk Society. So, this essay will begin here – outlining Beck’s thesis briefly before 
moving on to consider the usages and adaptations of this thesis that have taken place to make 
sense of the ‘risk consciousness’ and ‘logics’ that have variously informed understandings 
and practices of the ‘war on terror.’ Beck’s World Risk Society thesis describes a transition 
from early modernity (wherein the risks of industrialization could be tamed, managed and 
controlled through expert knowledge and rational calculation) to late modernity (wherein 
these risks have escaped our control and ‘we’ have consciousness of this). We are conscious 
that the outcomes of industrial ‘progress’ – including nuclear, chemical and genetic 
technology as well as the environmental consequences of ‘modernization’ – cannot be 
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reasonably managed and accommodated through traditional insurance schemes or security 
logics based on calculable threats and dangers (50-53). The genie is out of the bottle, so to 
speak, and ‘we’ have awareness of this with the result that late modern Risk Society becomes 
“reflexive”: “an issue and problem to itself” with socio-political ramifications for the very 
foundations of post-industrial society (72-81). The key points for this paper are as follows: 
(a) while consciousness of these changes is a social phenomenon (and, indeed constitutes the 
second stage in the transition from Industrial to Risk society) it is derived from the changed 
reality outlined above (the first stage in the transition); and (b) while the risks are global in 
nature (and cannot be contained to one community or even nation), the consciousness that 
emerges in response to these changes is that of ‘the West’ – emerging from its industrial 
history, political traditions and intellectual heritage. According to Beck, the latter may be re- 
harnessed to correct the mistakes of the past and to usher in a new “European global domestic 
policy” and “ecological enlightenment” (69-70). 
Applied to the ‘war on terror,’ Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen (2002) argues that the events 
of 9/11 actualized fears already present in the Western consciousness – in the form of the 
ontological insecurity experienced by the West in the 1990s. Rasmussen’s interest lies in the 
fact that in the absence of a clear statement of purpose from al-Qaida as to why they targeted 
the Twin Towers specifically, the attacks were interpreted within a framework of 
globalization that came to dominate Western conceptualisations of world order post-Cold 
War and to frame Western anxieties: “The most powerful explanation that first came to light 
was that al-Qaeda had chosen to attack the World Trade Centre because of its value as a 
symbol of globalization” (234). The question is how/why this explanation was so readily 
accepted and how/why globalization became the dominant framework for interpreting the 
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meaning of the attacks. But, despite the constructivist undertones informing this inquiry, 
Rasmussen, like Beck, arrives at a largely “realist” explanation3: 
This way of constructing 9/11 shows the reflexive nature of security policy in the 
late modern age. The new reflexivity manifested itself in the conclusion that even 
the U.S. had become a vulnerable ‘risk society’…Terrorism is regarded as an 
inherent risk in modern sociability because it is constructed as the negative 
consequence of the globalization process. The very process by which the West is 
believed to be transcending the modes of conflict and production of the 20th 
Century thus entails the creation of new threats and new modes of conflict (327). 
 
Rasmussen further explains that in adopting the framework of globalization to make sense of 
the attacks “the West [in fact] made its own fear al-Qaeda’s reason” (324, italics added). 
This latter statement is particularly interesting, raising as it does questions about the 
consciousness of risk that preceded the attacks. But, what is noteworthy for the purposes of 
my analysis, is that fear, anxiety and vulnerability emerge for Rasmussen, much like Beck, as 
consciousness of structural risks:  risks resultant from the particular configuration of the 
given economic and political order - in this case globalization. It is also noteworthy that 
‘Risk Society’ and ‘the West’ appear again as ontological givens. 
Like Baudrillard (2002), Rasmussen’s analysis seemingly stems from an interest in 
the foreboding knowledge (or sense of risk) that preceded the events of 9/11 such that the 
event itself may be understood as actualizing fears/desires already present:  We all dreamed 
it. But, whilst Baudrillard directs our attention to the political unconscious which (arguably) 
underpins this foreboding and the politics of knowing and un-knowing associated with the 
‘war on terror,’ Rasmussen directs our attention away from the knowing/un-knowing subject 
who dreams to our contemporary ontology and the objective insecurities produced by it. Like 
Beck, he assumes that risk consciousness, and even fear, derives from an apprehension of 
reality. The role of the social sciences, it seems, is to make transparent that which ‘is,’ but 
3 Beck describes himself as both a realist and constructivist. The limits of constructivism, he suggests, pertain 
to not being able “to define or declare what really ‘is’ or ‘is not’.” Realism enables him to engage with “new 
and contrary experiences of the global age of global risks” wherein, he argues, the nature of risk itself (and 
seemingly the nature of what is) has changed (133-134). 
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lies beyond immediate perception (the structural features of our world, for example) so that 
we might better understand our world and the possibilities within it. While nothing about this 
is particularly radical from a social scientific point of view, and may even appear sensible, 
the presumed link between risk (as a calculation of probability associated with structural 
change) and risk consciousness, even fear, is problematic. Why are we conscious of some 
risks and not others? Why fear? The aim of this project is to direct our attention back to the 
subject who perceives risk, does so as a member of a political community (‘the West’) and 
understands 9/11 as evidence of the risks associated with the fluidity of national borders and 
ease of movement associated with globalization. 
Critical governmentality approaches to risk or, post-9/11, to pre-cautionary risk as a 
logic, rather than an ontology, are helpful here. Claudia Aradau and Rens Van Munster 
(2007) have been particularly instructive, highlighting the ascendancy of the principle of 
precautionary risk logics in the aftermath of 9/11 not as a response to reality, but as a 
modality of approaching reality – a means of “organizing reality, disciplining the future, 
taming chance and rationalizing individual conduct” (95). In a nutshell, unlike risk 
assessments, precautionary risk logics demand that we act not on the basis of knowledge, but 
on the basis of “catastrophic contingency” – on the basis of the slightest conceivable risk of 
the absolute worst that could happen (101). Defined thus, “pre-emptive 
strikes…Guantanamo Bay, practices of extraordinary rendition…indefinite detention” and, I 
would add, generalized internet and phone record surveillance are all examples of 
“technologies appropriate to precautionary risk” (103). Tellingly, they cite Tony Blair’s 
decision to go to war against Iraq on the basis of the slightest conceivable risk that Iraq might 
possess any weapons of mass destruction as an exemplary example of the logic at play (105). 
Aradau and Van Munster point out that precautionary risk logics have become increasingly 
ascendant and they depart from Beck in two significant ways: (1) in the proposition that in 
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the absence of knowledge, modern technologies of governance and efforts to capture and 
control contingency proceed unabated, if not with more vigour, via a logic of precautionary 
risk; and (2) as indicated above, in their insistence (contra Beck) that this framework for 
thinking and acting upon the ‘war on terror’ is just that: a frame generated not by risk itself, 
but by a particular “dispositif of risk” (91). 
The critical import of their project lies in the latter and should not be underestimated 
as it allows them to shift the focus from risk per se (as given) towards an analysis of the ways 
“the world and existing problematizations are made into risks” and “what effects this form of 
ordering entails upon populations” (2007, 97). Of particular interest to this essay, is the fact 
that later, in a later Special Issue of Security Dialogue, they, along with Luis Lobo-Guerrero, 
point out that precautionary risk logics can re-activate Orientalist frameworks for seeing 
(Aradau, Lobo-Guerrero, and Van Munster 2008, 151). This is a point Louise Amoore 
(2007), amongst others, develop elsewhere and I will return to such analyses later.  But, 
rather than reading the work of these authors as illustrative of the above statement, I will use 
it to disrupt the grammar in Aradau and Van Munster’s (2007) claims – a point which ties 
into my main criticism of their development of Beck’s World Risk Society thesis. My 
criticism is this: despite the critical intent of their work, their analysis does not go far enough 
if we want to understand the subjects of/at risk (the emergence of the terrorized, traumatized 
Western liberal subject) and it may, in fact, distort our understanding of the salience of 
precautionary risk logics. It should be stated from the outset that this critique should in no 
way be interpreted as a reflection of the rich body of scholarship these scholars have 
contributed to. What I will describe as one of consequences of Aradau’s and Van Munster’s 
(2007) analysis does not necessarily reflect (and may, indeed, offend) their intentions. These 
qualifying remarks are important – not only in the spirit of collegiality and fairness, but 
because if the effects I describe do betray their intentions, the question is ‘how/why did this 
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happen?’ The reasons for this, I suggest, have methodological and epistemological 
implications for critical IR scholarship in terms of questions of how we know and larger 
issues pertaining to the politics of knowing and un-knowing at work in IR. 
Certainly, this critique builds on the work of those before me (many of whose insights 
I will draw upon in the alternative genealogical account of risk and the ‘war on terror’ to 
follow). It contains, for instance, strong echoes of Meera Sabaratnam’s (2013, 259) reminder 
(citing Wallerstein) that “Eurocentrism has many avatars.” My distinct contribution lies in 
pointing to additional ways that Eurocentrism has taken root in our disciplinary frameworks 
for seeing and knowing with a particular focus on the literature on Risk and the ‘War on 
Terror’ (even and perhaps most tellingly in the critical literature), and in pointing towards 
ways we might see and know differently. Following Sabaratnam (2013), Eurocentrism often 
remains rooted in our basic ontologies, albeit as so unremarkable as to escape notice - 
beginning for instance with a cartography that takes as given the distinctiveness of ‘the West’ 
as an entity with its own logics, history and attributes. It simply is or inadvertently becomes 
in our writing as if it was there all along and whatever our critically-informed starting point. 
My critique of Aradau and Van Munster (2007) is precisely this. Regardless of their starting 
point or intentions, their analytical framework leads them to an analysis that reproduces and 
even extends a particular historiography of ‘the West’ as an actor with its own reasons and 
logics - as opposed to one that would have us inquire into the conditions of ‘the West’s’ 
possible articulation, insofar as it is possible to speak of something like a Western 
consciousness or political unconscious. 
By shifting from risk as an ontology to risk (or precautionary risk) as a logic, Aradau 
and Van Munster (2007) politicize risk. But, the framework and grammar they employ - 
wherein a particular risk dispositif emerges, inscribes reality and governs - has the effect of 
disembodying precautionary risk logic, separating it from the desires and anxieties that 
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animate it and from the co-constitution of the subjects of/at risk. This grammar is evident, for 
example, in the following statements: “the ‘war on terror’ displays an insatiable quest for 
knowledge” and “risk inscribes reality as harbouring ‘potential dangerous irruptions’” (91 
and 98, bold and italics added).  While the ‘war on terror’ is presented within quotation 
marks, highlighting the term’s obsequiousness, the effect remains that risk logics and/or the 
‘war on terror’ (read through the logic of precautionary risk) act on bodies that are always 
already present as members of a ‘Western’ population. In a sense, this is the point – i.e., to 
demonstrate that “[g]overnmental rationalities and technologies [in this case, those associated 
with precautionary risk] affect behaviour and ‘construct’ forms of ordered agency and 
subjectivity in the population to be governed” (97). 
In addition to subsuming questions of human agency, not to mention power relations, 
the effect of their analytical frame is to ascribe governmental modalities with transparency - 
as if they speak for themselves. Ultimately, this enables Aradau and Van Munster (2007) to 
go so far as to claim that within the dominant dispositif of precautionary risk, the “war[s] of 
Afghanistan and Iraq do not speak of a recent rediscovery of militarism,” but of a technology 
of precaution, “mobilized alongside other technologies of precaution…to avoid terrorist 
irruptions in the future” (105, bold and italics added). The voice of power and critique merge 
here. It is almost as if the ‘we’ of ‘the West’, understood as the targets of terror, are being 
governed by a particular logic seemingly fit for ‘our’ secular, cosmopolitan, postmodern age. 
It is almost as if, in this brave new world, it is rationalities and logics that govern. Hence, 
even if we heed Aradau and Van Munster’s injunction to think critically about these 
developments and their effects, those charged with ‘our’ security can be considered to be 
drawing upon a particular form of reason, extemporaneous of power relations. In this way, 
critique becomes complicit with and perpetuates the deceits of power, displacing fear and 
desire with reason and rationality in ways that grant the ‘War on Terror’ a certain logic. And 
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‘the West,’ as a foreign policy actor, (re)appears in ways that resemble the stories told about 
‘it’ by heads of state and security experts – ontologically distinct – in ways that do nothing to 
disturb contemporary cartographies and frameworks for thinking risk/war. 
How did this happen? It is in asking how this came to be – how otherwise critical 
scholarship failed to produce what Sara Ahmed (2004a) might call “effects that are critical, in 
the sense of challenging relations of power that remain concealed as…givens” – that this 
paper moves from an engagement with particular texts towards an engagement with larger 
questions about methodology and epistemology in IR. Having outlined the particular regime 
of visuality offered by certain risk/governmentality analyses of contemporary security issues 
and the limits of these approaches, insofar as they tend to reproduce dominant ways of seeing 
and knowing, the next section will offer suggestions for how we might see differently. How 
might we move from a focus on the sayable and the said to the unsaid (to the formative 
disavowals and politics of un-knowing) and to the bodies that negotiate this terrain, rendering 
particular logics of risk and the subjects of/at risk intelligible, if not simply given? 
Returning to David Campbell’s (1998, 1) point that danger does not exist independently from 
those to whom it poses a threat, this essay seeks to extend his insights to the literature on risk 
and build upon them – inquiring into the status of the logic of precautionary risk as a relation 
of power/knowledge. More specifically, in a reversal of Aradau and Van Munster’s 
suggestion that contemporary wars can be understood as a technology of a precautionary 
logic, this essay will attempt to situate the logic of precautionary risk as a tactic of war (in a 
Foucauldian sense) - animated by a wide range of desires, interests and anxieties in a context 
of highly unequal power relations. 
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Methodological considerations: 
 
Taking a page from Carol Cohn’s (1987) ground-breaking article ‘Sex, Death and the 
Rational World of Defence Intellectuals,’ that shifted the discussion from one of the logic of 
deterrence theory (good or bad?) to one of the fears and desires that gave rise to it, this article 
will urge an approach that puts the talking heads in their place. However, in a departure from 
Cohn, it will do so without recourse to the psyche or the psychological make-up of the 
terrorized, traumatized Western subject. Its concern rather is what might be called “the 
aesthetic subject” of terror – to adapt Michael Shapiro’s (2013, 11) phrase. Taking from 
Shapiro, “the value of conceiving subjects aesthetically rather than psychologically [derives 
insofar as] [t]heir movements and dispositions are less significant in terms of what is revealed 
about their inner lives than what they tell us about the world to which they belong” (11). But, 
unlike Shapiro, my concern with the aesthetic subject is not specifically with those “who, 
through artistic genres, articulate and mobilize thinking” (11). More broadly and more 
narrowly, my concern is with the bodies that simultaneously invigorate and, in a sense, come 
to be in and through discourses of precautionary risk. 
The aim is not to ascertain the truth of the subject in terms of the meaning or intent 
underlying their speech, but the value of a particular discursive formation – such as the 
dispositif of precautionary risk. On this, Shapiro (2013) points to a particularly useful 
passage by Foucault: 
To analyse a discursive formation is…to weigh the value of statements. A value 
that is not defined by their truth, that is not gauged by the presence of a secret 
content; but which characterizes their place, their capacity for circulation and 
exchange (4, italics added). 
 
It is to ask about “the historical moments in which alternative subjects emerge within 
different historical worlds” (Shapiro 2013, 6) – when, for example, the most powerful and 
secure on the planet seemingly identify as collective subjects of terror/trauma within the 
context of a global war. Seen thus, the dispositif of precautionary risk is less important as a 
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governing logic per se than as a currency of exchange within a particular set of power 
relations. 
Adding to this, in ways that arguably move us beyond Foucault, this project involves, 
in Ann Laura Stoler’s (1995, 5) words, “disassembl[ing] the neat divisions that could imagine 
a European history and its unified collectivities apart from the externalized Others on whom 
it was founded and which it produced” (Also see Sabaratnam 2013). This is not simply a 
matter of pointing to the ways the ‘war on terror’ draws upon and reproduces Orientalist 
stereotypes and power relations in terms of hierarchical binary divides between the ‘us’ over 
here and the ‘them’ over there – as pre-constituted categories available for (re)production and 
re-articulation. Here Ahmed’s (2007) work on the phenomenology of whiteness and the 
surfacing of bodies will be drawn upon as it can draw our attention from the spoken word and 
economies of logic to the bodies or aesthetic subjects that speak and cohere around particular 
words and discursive formations. More generally it can draw our attention to ‘the bodily’ or 
that which Diana Coole (2007, 175-176) might refer to as the “entire corporeal subtext of 
lived meanings [that] is always interwoven with cognition and discursive exchanges.” These 
lived meanings and performances – the various gazes, the politics of knowing and un- 
knowing, and the cultural politics of emotion that Ahmed (2004b; 2007) describes in terms of 
feelings of towards-ness and away-ness and shrinking and expanding, that pepper our 
everyday exchanges and shape our very being-in-the-world, tend to escape our analysis. Yet, 
this article will argue that they can offer us a great deal more in terms of our ability to 
understand the logic of precautionary risk’s capacity for circulation and exchange than a 
history of Western consciousness offered by Beck (1999) and extended by Aradau and Van 
Munster (2007). 
Weaving in the “corporeal subtext of lived meanings” will, for the purposes of this 
article, involve looking beyond official government statements – although these will be 
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included as they too form part of the web of meaning and experience - to the news media, 
popular culture, literary fiction and personal lived experience. It will involve extending the 
regime of visuality from the stuff of official record (the officially said and the say-able) to the 
myriad forms of communication and exchange – the everyday power relations that underpin 
and undercut the public discourse of precautionary risk. Literary fiction can be particularly 
valuable here. As Alina Sajed (2103, 10) has said of the value of literary texts for IR 
scholarship, they are able “to draw on complex maps of socio-political interactions.” 
Similarly, I hope to offer a new story and/or an alternative genealogy of the dispositif of 
precautionary risk, one that does not dismiss those offered previously, but resituates ‘risk 
society’ and precautionary risk logics within a more complex map of power relations. 
This alternative mapping will trace articulations of precautionary risk – and, more 
specifically, articulations of the subject of precautionary risk – across three utterances chosen 
to represent three distinctive temporal moments characterizing ‘Western’ negotiations with 
the ‘War on Terror.’ It will begin by returning to the Baudrillard (2002) quote that instigated 
this paper and which speaks of a consciousness of risk that preceded the 9/11 attacks.  Next, 
it will turn to the popular refrain, ‘Why do they hate us so much?’ to chart the transition from 
the language of risk to the language of war. Finally, this article will turn to the infamous 
quote by then U.S. Defense Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, which reflects another shift, away 
from a framework of war towards the more abstract framework of risk - albeit here I suggest 
that we can see that the framework of risk is also/always a framework of war. The aim is to 
draw attention to the links between the abstract subject of precautionary risk (or the subject 
who is interpellated within a logic of “catastrophic contingency” [Aradau and Van Munster 
2011]) and the terrorized/traumatized Western liberal subject – highlighting the corporeal 
subtext of lived meanings and uneven power relations that underpin public forms of speech 
and abstract logics. 
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To be clear, whilst this paper is focussing its discussion around articulations of risk, 
its concern is to untangle that “which characterizes their place, their capacity for circulation 
and exchange” (Foucault quoted in Shapiro 2013, 4). Its concern is with the formative 
disavowals, the politics of knowing and un-knowing that call forth, invigorate and give 
meaning to particular articulations of risk. Here I wish to introduce a more corporeal and 
textured tale of the emergence of the dispositif of precautionary risk – by looking beyond the 
statements to the bodies that utter and cohere around them. Objectors may point out that the 
account developed herein is also particular: that there are other ways lines could be drawn 
and dots connected between texts, events and experiences (i.e., that there are other stories that 
could be told). To this, my response is simply ‘yes’ and in the spirit of what I understand to 
be post-structuralism’s most valuable contribution to IR, let’s tell more. But, I begin here. 
 
We all dreamed it: 
 
I begin again with Baudrillard’s (2002) quote and the suggestions it contains for how 
we might see/know differently before adapting this, in line with the methodological 
considerations I outline above, to introduce a new story or perhaps to re-tell a story we knew 
all along but somehow forgot. Once again, this story begins before it began – or at least as 
some of us remember it, with a sense of foreboding in a time not so long ago: 
The fact that we have dreamed this event, that everyone without exception has 
dreamt of it – because no one can avoid dreaming of the destruction of any power 
that has become hegemonic to this degree – is unacceptable to the Western moral 
conscience (5). 
 
This articulation of a sense of foreboding risk captured by this statement is provocative in and 
of itself, but particularly notable to the extent that, contra Rasmussen, Baudrillard invokes 
and unsettles ‘the Western subject’ of/at risk as something other than and Other to itself. Not 
only did ‘we’ dream it, ‘we’ wished it, asserts Baudrillard: “If this is not taken into account, 
the event loses any symbolic dimension” (5). ‘We’/everyone wished it (as countless 
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Hollywood movies attest) not necessarily because of malice or a suicidal death wish, but 
because, for Baudrillard, it simply could not be otherwise (6-7) . 
And yet, it is because this dream and that which Baudrillard suggests underlies it – 
i.e., knowledge of a highly unequal and inherently unstable set of power relations - must be 
disavowed, at least by some, that there is a schism embedded at the heart of this sentence 
between a universal ‘we’ and a particular ‘we’ with a “Western moral conscience.” Herein 
lay the seeds of a tale about risk and its demarcations and the wars fought to establish and re- 
establish these lines. More specifically, here begins a story about the subjects who locate 
themselves within and against the moral-political complex of knowing and un-knowing in the 
‘War on Terror’ and the formative disavowals which reside at the heart of identity formation, 
culture and understandings of risk.  Charting this tale is to ask questions about what within 
the terms of a Western moral consciousness or ideological frame cannot be known, is un- 
known and/or is necessarily excluded within particular discursive formations. With this as 
our starting point we might begin to see the circulation value of the language and logic of 
‘risk’ – a language that, par excellence, keeps some forms of seeing and knowing at a 
distance. 
But, first things first. In the days and months preceding 9/11, what forms of knowing 
were kept at a distance? Here Rasmussen’s (2002) argument regarding the narrative 
construction of 9/11 within the framework of globalization can again be useful, less as a 
particular account of risk than in terms of what this particular excludes from view - notably 
the issue of power relations. While fear factors in Rasmussen’s account, fear emerges from 
consciousness of the risks associated with globalization/openness. Even whilst 
contemplating elements of imperialism in the U.S. response to 9/11, imperialism was 
identified in terms of a Hobbesian moment and one that signified a pivot point for the future 
of world order and global society: “it took decisive action to counterattack terrorism at the 
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same time as it emphasized that the ontology of modern society still ought to be defined by 
liberal ideas” (337-8). Imperialism, as Rasmussen describes it, did not feature within 
globalization per se. It harkened back to a time prior, albeit threatened to return as a “people 
realize[d] that the societal foundations of their lives [were] not as secure as they believed 
them to be” (337). As Rasmussen explains, the belief in American exceptionalism – in this 
case the idea that that the U.S. was the only substantial force standing in the way of terrorism 
and guarding civilization - could yield imperialism’s return in the form of the U.S. as global 
Leviathan. This was the concern. And this concern signified for Rasmussen the tensions 
inherent in the globalization discourse: “globalization is a way of conceptualising a time of 
transcendence [wherein “Western victory in the Cold War had allowed it to define the world 
on its own terms” (342)], but it is also a political means to get a desired kind of 
transcendence” (343). Hence, debates between conservative imperialists and liberal 
cosmopolitans ensued, concerning how best to make it so: whether by appealing to a global 
Leviathan to defend ‘the West’ (defined in terms of globalization) or extending the liberal 
values of ‘the West’ across the globe (343). 
Framed thus, imperialism always resided within globalization – at its very heart. This 
is the stated and unstated and the known and un-known that underlies Rasmussen’s analysis. 
Rasmussen momentarily recognizes globalization within a framework of war (in the terms of 
“Western victory”), but almost simultaneously disavows this knowledge. He does this, as 
illustrated above, by splitting Western liberal cosmopolitan values from imperialism – a cut 
which makes sense insofar as liberal cosmopolitan values are global/transcendent and we can 
imagine their spread (in the contemporary context) outside of a context of war and a cut 
which ignores the tremendous body of scholarship that points to liberalism’s historic 
entanglement with imperialist aims. Remarkably, had he not performed this ‘cut’, the sense 
of foreboding that he describes as existing prior to 9/11 would hardly appear so mysterious! 
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The analysis to follow will demonstrate that a deeper exploration of the tensions within 
globalization discourse can help to bridge the gap between knowledge of ‘structural risks’ of 
openness and consciousness of these risks – and, indeed, can tell us something about the 
subject of/at risk. 
The crux of the problem is this: Opening my bottom floor windows on a warm sunny 
day does not in and of itself generate a consciousness of my heightened exposure to risk. 
Conscious of the closed stale air and smell of my dog, I might welcome the breeze that comes 
in and experience a physical sense of ease/lightness that comes with associations of summer. 
I might not be conscious of the risks that an intruder or foreboding storm could pose due to 
my heightened exposure. By contrast, Rasmussen and Baudrillard identify a sense of 
foreboding risk prior to 9/11 and situate it within a global political framework – a framework 
inextricably embedded within highly unequal power relations. However, as both analyses 
attest (each in their own way), this is a framework that cannot fully acknowledge the 
disparities at its heart (e.g., that symbolically ‘globalization’ belongs to ‘the West’). 
Globalization, as highlighted in Rasmussen’s account, is situated as ‘the West’s’ to bestow, 
deny or impose on ‘its’ terms. Note that ‘the West’ minimally features here as an identity 
marker and whilst it can be appropriated in different ways, in the aftermath of the Cold War, 
globalization became one of ‘its’ primary signifiers: signifying no less than transcendence 
and enlightenment. 
The result is that while ‘globalization’ (as a process, phenomenon and/or outcome of a 
myriad of political, economic and cultural events associated with the end of the Cold War) 
promised a global order premised upon universal values, ‘the West’ was reproduced within 
its discursive terms as the exemplar civilization. While racialized notions of superiority 
became a taboo narrative in ‘the West’ (as a means of justifying globalization’s global 
aspirations), white, middle-class masculinity remained the somatic norm (Chernobrov 2014; 
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Puwar 2004; Ahmed 2007). If the strains are not evidenced enough in the basic grammatical 
tensions highlighted in the bracketed portion of the previous sentence, they came into sharp 
relief when President Bush, in an admitted unfortunate choice of words, pronounced in the 
days after the 9/11 attacks that the “barbarians had declared war” (BBC News online) – i.e., 
when Western leaders on both sides of the Atlantic variously declared the events of 9/11 to be 
“a declaration of war against all of civilization” (See Rasmussen 2002, 333).  From here on 
in, globalization would be divided; it had a dark side. There were barbarians amongst ‘us.’ 
I will return to this, but I think it is important to focus a little longer on the nascent 
anxieties that would be actualised through the events of 9/11, but that pre-existed the event 
and are of a significantly different order than Rasmussen (2002) describes – not belonging to 
the ‘fact’ of risk (wherein risk itself is a structural property of a globalized world). These 
anxieties may be thought of as a ‘structural’ property of the traumatized Western liberal 
subject, but in ways that are of an entirely more immanent and, indeed, intimate nature – 
belonging to the very process of subject formation. More than a location on a map or a 
population, the salience of ‘the West’ as an identity marker, like any identity marker, is 
always contextual - as poignantly evident in the headline, “We are all Americans [now]!” 
published in the French newspaper, Le Monde, following the 9/11 attacks (Colombani 2001). 
As will be demonstrated, our identifications/dis-identifications are lived embodied 
experiences and negotiations: sometimes habituated, sometimes owned, sometimes disowned, 
sometimes tried on, and sometimes transgressed/made hybrid (i.e., the stuff of popular culture 
sensations). ‘The West’ as an enduring category depends upon meanings and interpretations 
of experiences that are lived and negotiated by the individuals who variously inhabit and 
make meaningful or unmeaningful spatial maps. Risk consciousness is a lived experience, a 
practice and/or experience of identity, and a way-of-being. From a phenomenological 
viewpoint, Ahmed (2004b, 69) points out that “vulnerability involves a particular kind of 
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bodily relation to the world in which openness itself is read as a potential site of danger.” 
The experience of vulnerability, in the face of the openness of globalization, is, amongst 
other things, a means of identifying self and home and engaging with the world. 
Absented from Rasmussen’s account of the Western consciousness of risk are what 
Stoler (1995, 198) has referred to as the “crisis and anxieties of securing bourgeois [Western] 
identity in a transcultural world.” The ‘crises’ which render this identity insecure and at 
perpetual risk of disintegration and/or megalomaniac paranoia are of a two-fold nature which 
run at cross-cutting purposes. On the one hand, core and periphery no longer clearly map 
onto geopolitical entities – such that ‘the West’ becomes increasingly problematic as a 
category and is obliged to do so under the terms of globalization. On the other hand, core and 
periphery stubbornly persist.  Media images of the disjuncture between the hype and reality 
of our globalized world loom large and are brought ‘home.’  Edward Said’s (1993, 396) list 
of those who seem to be falling through the cracks of globalized regimes of governance 
capture this well: 
[from those involved in mass uprisings to] refugees and “boat people,” those 
unresting and vulnerable itinerants; the starving populations of the Southern 
Hemisphere; the destitute but insistent homeless who…shadow the Christmas 
shoppers in Western cities…[and so on and so forth]. 
 
Whilst these images may be useful towards reaffirming a bourgeois Western identity and 
sense of superiority in a transcultural world, they do not necessarily sit easy. In the words of 
British sculptor, Antony Gormley, “In a time of global unity it is just not possible to have that 
kind of division any more and this is the unconscious and the third world brought right into 
our living room to occupy space and it feels uncomfortable and causes anxiety” (Quoted in 
Puwar 2004, 31). 
Arguably, these cracks in our contemporary world order demand new forms of 
governance and order and new governing rationalities. For Said (1996, 396), “[n]one has 
seemed so easily available, so conveniently attractive as appeals to tradition, national or 
20  
religious identity, [and] patriotism.” But, for the liberal, Western-identified subject who has 
left these things behind, and yet experiences ‘unease’ in the face of globalization, governing 
rationalities presented in terms of precautionary risk logics might offer a certain comfort, 
even appeal. Understood thus, the dispositif of precautionary risk may be understood as 
emerging from a significantly different conjuncture what has heretofore been described. 
Hence, while Aradau, Lobo-Guerrero and Van Munster (2008, 151) have written that 
“[s]tereotypes of the ‘other’ and imaginaries of the Islamic terrorist are insidiously 
reactivated within the framework of risk,” I contend that race was there all along, running 
under and alongside it, and calling it forth. A governing order based on precautionary risk 
logics expounds a story of modern reason and transcendence and a ‘we’ who is at risk from 
the dark side of globalization (and all those associated with it). Speaking to the theme of the 
risks and benefits of globalization at a Labour Party conference in 2001, Tony Blair 
explained that ‘the threat’ is broader than al-Qaeda or terrorism: 
…the threat is chaos because for people with work to do, family life to balance, 
mortgages to pay, pensions to provide, the yearning is for order and stability and 
if it doesn’t exist elsewhere, it is unlikely to exist here. I have long believed this 
interdependence defines the new world we live in (Quoted Abrahamsen 2005, 67, 
bold and italics added). 
 
As Rita Abrahamsen (2002, 67-68) suggests, the quote “is worth dwelling on”: “For Blair, 
chaos is represented by those who do not go to work, who don’t have mortgages to pay, 
[etc.]”; it is signified by those who live ‘elsewhere’ and yet, as a result of globalization, have 
“the capacity to destroy the order and stability of the ‘here.’” 
Risk Society, mapped onto Western Society, addresses the discomforts of what Homi 
Bhabha (1994, 86) refers to as “the menace of race” in a context of transculturalism or 
hybridity – keeping, the difference in place while ostensibly erasing the matter of race. 
Ahmed (1999, 97) summarizes Bhabha’s account, with specific reference to the colonial 
context, particularly well: 
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In Homi Bhabha’s account of hybridity as destabilizing, hybridity does not 
‘belong’ to the mixed race subject. Rather, hybridity is determined by the very 
structure of the colonial address which demands both the disavowal and 
affirmation of difference. The colonizing mission is a civilizing one: it assumes 
that the colonized subject can reflect back the values and practices of the 
colonizer. And yet the civilizing mission must have its limits if it is to maintain 
the structure of authority which secures whiteness as the sign of the mark of 
privilege. 
 
Bhabha (1994, 86) explains “the menace of race” in terms of the threat that the integrated 
colonized subject poses to the colonizer – i.e., insofar as the colonized successfully mimics 
the colonizer (in terms of embodiment, style, dress, etc.), s/he both gains access to a new 
platform for resistance and un-founds colonial authority. As Ahmed (1999, 97) explains, 
“The colonizer can be copied; the epistemic privilege is not found in nature.” 
Building on this, I propose that the “menace of race” can also translate into the desire 
for race and its menacing face - specifically, the desire to locate ‘it’ in the body of the other. 
This is the desire to recover the difference and, in so doing, the idealized self – to recover the 
menace (the source of the tensions I have described) as a property of the abject/the Other and, 
in so doing, to purify the self of hatred and violence and reaffirm the self’s claim to authority. 
In distinction to Bhabha’s account, my focus is less on race as something already present than 
something sought, albeit repressed, within the discursive terms of the enlightened Western 
liberal subject (although the two are bound together as the aim is to make present). This is in 
line with what Ahmed (2004b, 24-25) describes as the productive role of emotions in the 
surfacing of bodies and bodily intensities – the productive role of felt ‘vulnerability’ and 
‘threat’ in creating and sustaining an ‘us’ and a ‘them.’ This desire for race, in its more 
sublimated form, is perhaps nowhere more evident than in success of Mohsin Hamid’s (2007) 
best-selling novel, The Reluctant Fundamentalist. 
Translated into more than 25 languages and shortlisted for the Man Booker Prize 
(Closs Stephens 2011, 225), the novel’s suspense derives from the unknown intentions of the 
main protagonist, a Pakistani man by the name of Changez, towards ‘the American’ whose 
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seat we are literally situated in. We are the audience as Changez recounts his story.  This is 
the story of a Muslim man who, having successfully occupied the position of a Western 
liberal subject (being educated at Princeton and working as a highly paid analyst for a 
financial advisory firm), becomes increasingly disenchanted with the United States in the 
aftermath of 9/11 and returns to Pakistan where we learn he teaches at university and begins 
to radicalize his students. What Hamid is staging is the West’s encounter with its Other – and 
we sit anxiously while Changez, described by one reviewer as the “bearded, vaguely 
menacing stranger” (LitLovers), reveals more and more. 
Angharad Closs Stephens (2011, 256) suggests that much of the fascination with this 
novel derives from the fact that in the immediacy of the moment (“before any broader 
implications become clear”) when Changez first saw the Twin Towers fall on a television 
screen from a hotel room in Manila, he smiled. In his words, “I stared as one – and then the 
other – of the twin towers of the New York’s World Trade Centre collapsed. And then I 
smiled” (Hamid 2007, 82-83). According to Closs Stephens (2011, 256), “[t]he liberal press 
[and many reviewers of the novel] made big news of this extract, which was largely 
considered to reveal the view of America from other parts of the world.” In the words of one 
reviewer, “[The book] says things people don’t want to hear. [It] says dangerous things in 
dangerous times” (Quoted in Closs Stephens 2011, 256). But, in fact, sales suggest exactly 
the opposite – that people wanted to hear more. For Closs Stephens (2011, 259), the book’s 
success may unfortunately “be attributed to the fact that, for a left-leaning liberal reader, we 
are reassured of what we ‘already know’ – that despite the mixture of the global city, national 
identities must triumph and that there is a fundamental gulf between ‘us’ and ‘them.’” But, 
while there is undoubtedly some truth to this statement, to suggest that this is a limitation of 
the book does it a disservice. 
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For while the book is staged as an encounter between ‘us’ and our Other, the Other 
does not simply perform according to script and, in fact, is never fully revealed as friend or 
foe – a point I will return to. Taken out of context, the fact that Changez smiled could 
suggest that he was the menace all along, but the reader knows this was not the case. The 
reader knew that more than a Pakistani or an American, he initially at least identified as a 
New Yorker. He fit in. Despite phenotype, he embodied the somatic norm. In his words: 
Two of my colleagues were women; Wainwright and I were non-white. We were 
marvellously diverse and yet we were not: all of us hailed from the same elite 
universities…and not one of us was short or overweight (Hamid 2007, 42-43). 
 
He fell in love with an American woman. He was ‘one of us.’ And he was ‘one of us’ in 
another way as well. For whatever we individually experienced when we first viewed one 
plane and then the other crash into the Twin Towers, at least according to Baudrillard (2002), 
we all dreamt it. 
Arguably this holds even if ‘we’ didn’t know who the enemy was or what side ‘we’ 
were on in the immediacy of that moment. It is hardly insignificant to note that I happened to 
be at a renowned left-leaning Canadian university that day and can remember when, in the 
immediacy of the moment, some, who were taken in by the abstract symbolism of the event, 
cheered. This was, of course, prior to the media focus on the bodies and stories of individual 
lives lost. The point is that if this was momentarily interpreted by some as the first salvo in 
what was to be a greater war against globalization and all it had come to stand for (i.e., ‘the 
system’ itself), it is worth noting that perhaps for a brief moment – before George Bush’s 
“Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists” (CNN.com, 2001) – there may have 
been tensions, but the forms of alignment our own bodies had taken/would take in relation to 
these were not so clear. It should not be forgotten that this happened at a time when the anti- 
globalization movement(s) finally seemed to be gaining the sympathy and ear of the 
mainstream press. There was perhaps a moment when, countering the desire for the 
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perpetuation of privilege, there was a nascent counter-desire (premised on a different bodily 
alignment) that Baudrillard (2002, 73) describes thus: one with aim “of turning around and 
overturning power, not in the name of a moral or religious confrontation, nor some ‘clash of 
civilizations,’ but as a result of the pure and simple unacceptability of that global power.” 
For a moment perhaps Changez, like many of us, sat on a precipice. 
 
Why do they hate us so much? 
 
But, this too had to be forgotten. As is well known, in the days and weeks following 
the 9/11 attacks much effort was put into establishing these lines – “the split imaginative 
geographies of ‘us’ and ‘them’” (Gregory 2004, 11) captured nowhere more clearly than in 
the popular refrain ‘Why do they hate us so much?’.  Derek Gregory (2004, 21) has pointed 
to the uneven power relations invoked in this question, accepting as it does “the privilege of 
contemplating ‘the other’ without allowing the gaze in return” and, in fact, demanding a great 
deal of forgetting. Whilst Closs Stephens (2011) is right to suggest that the novel provides a 
platform for this “gaze in return” (259) – which might be thought to “reaffirm the spatial 
demarcations between ‘us’ and ‘them’” (257) – we might read this otherwise. Whilst the 
novel highlights the disjuncture between the myth and reality of globalization and situates the 
reader in the seat of ‘the American’ who is caught within the gaze of ‘the Pakistani’ (who not 
only recounts his story, but reflects back to us our discomfort and ‘Western-isms’), it 
simultaneously undermines the naturalness of this divide by showing the multiple labours 
involved in its production. Here, through Changez’s eyes, we bear witness to both the 
megalomaniac paranoia of the U.S. in the aftermath of the attacks, but also the effects of this 
– as bodies re-align and bodies intensify as sites of threat/fear. 
 
The novel highlights the ways in which the divide between ‘us’ and ‘them’ 
materialised not only in official pronouncements and media hyperbole, but in and through 
bodily reactions – bodily bristles, registers of vision, and the gaze. From a phenomenological 
25  
viewpoint, we notice how the ‘rightful’ claims Changez once had to the world and his sense 
of belonging are taken away in ways that are intimate/personal such that, to echo Fanon 
(1986, 83-84), “[t]he real world challenged [his] claims…the corporeal schema [he had 
known] crumbled.” In fact, his story begins thus: “I was a New Yorker with a city at my 
feet. How soon that would change!” (Hamid 2007, 51). Recounting his earlier and happier 
days in New York he describes his experience thus: 
It was a testament to the open-mindedness and – that overused word – 
cosmopolitan nature of New York in those days that I felt completely comfortable 
on the subway in this attire [“a starched white kurta of delicately worked cotton 
over a pair of jeans”]. Indeed, no one seemed to take much notice of me at all 
(55). 
 
Since then, his became a body that would be stopped and forced to strip on his return flight 
from Manila to New York. His became a body that was now cast suspicious glances and 
“subject to verbal abuse by complete strangers” (148). He was told that his beard made his 
colleagues uneasy. Through the novel we witness less the radicalization of Changez than his 
racialization; we witness it as a process that occurs in the course of an individual life. This 
novel seems to be a case of art imitating life, albeit within the novel we get ‘life’ (or the story 
of a life) whereas otherwise ‘we’ (or at least the ‘we’ who fell on a different side of the 
dividing line and/or negotiated it differently) may only catch it in snippets. But, clearly, the 
snippets are everywhere. It’s a matter of how/where/when they register. In the case of this 
essay it’s a matter of how they register within the stories we tell of Western Risk Society. 
Let’s consider two examples. The accidental shooting of Charles de Menezes, the 
Brazilian man mistaken for a terrorist and shot dead by London Metropolitan Police, can 
serve as one rather notorious example. By way of a more ‘mundane’ example (variations of 
which recur across the Western world), let’s also consider the following news snippet from a 
news article documenting increased attacks on Muslim pupils in the U.K.: 
In one case, a teenage Muslim pupil at school in Oxfordshire was …allegedly 
slapped and called a “terrorist” by classmates after a teacher raised the murders of 
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12 people at a French magazine in a classroom discussion and suggested Muslims 
should be “challenged” by the display of cartoons of the Prophet Mohamed 
(Milmo 2015). 
 
In these instances, ‘the repressed’ was temporarily granted relief – at least insofar as “the 
myth of a liberal, colour-blind society [was] momentarily ruptured” (Pugliese, 2006). A 
mock, photo-shopped image of a London Tube Station ‘Service Information’ (circulated as 
an original on the internet) effectively makes the point: 
NOTICE TO ALL PASSENGERS: Please do not run on the platforms or 
concourses. Especially if you are carrying a rucksack, wearing a big coat, or look 
a bit foreign. This notice is for your own safety. Thank you (Pugliese, 2006, 
bold and italics added). 
 
In both cases, the Other is marked “in contradistinction to the normative white corpus of the 
English nation [and, indeed, the ‘civilized’ ‘Western world’] – and, by extension, as a threat 
(Pugliese, 2006). Yet, in both instances what remains repressed is that which Madeleine- 
Sophie Abbas (2015) has described as “white terror.” It was the Muslim pupil who, as a 
result of the bullying, reportedly did not want to return to school, that was labelled a 
“terrorist” (Milmo 2015), just as it was He who looked “a bit foreign” that British police shot 
dead. Via the process of abjection, the pervasive dailiness of white violence demonstrated in 
these accounts was projected onto ‘them’ – the terrorists who lurk everywhere. 
Ahmed (2004b, 69) describes the ways in which “fear works to contain bodies such 
that they take up less space.” Emotions, in Ahmed’s (2004b, 69) analysis do not simply 
reflect the psychological state or interior world of the subject, they are productive: “emotions 
work to align bodily space with social space.” But, fear, whilst involving a shrinking of the 
body can work in unusual ways. Here Ahmed (2004b, 69) refers to the renowned example of 
a racist encounter described by Fanon when, while seated on a train across from a young 
child and his mother, the child pointed and proclaimed, “Mama, see the negro! I’m 
frightened”: “[In this] encounter…we can see that the white child’s apparent fear does not 
lead to his refusal to inhabit the world, but to his embrace of the world through the apparently 
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safe enclosure formed by the loved other (being-at-home).” Rather, it was Fanon (1986, 84- 
85), dissected by the child’s eyes – “battered down by tom-toms, cannibalism, intellectual 
deficiency, fetishism, racial defects, [and] slave ships” - who shrunk and took up less space, 
leading to Ahmed’s (2004b, 69) conclusion that “fear works to restrict some bodies through 
the movement or expansion of others.” 
Applied to the ‘war on terror,’ we can see that the effect of war is less containment 
than remobilization – the return of the repressed, a re-invigoration of imperialism. In 
Ahmed’s (2004b, 73) words, “Bush…turns the act of terror into an act of war, which would 
seek to eliminate the source of fear and transform the world into a place whereby the mobility 
of some capital and some bodies becomes the sign of freedom and civilisation.” Within this 
quote we can glimpse the almost seamless transition from discourses of risk to war and, as I 
will outline in the next section, the slide back again such that war, in somewhat Orwellian 
form, is framed as simply a technology of risk. If the end of the Cold War and the calls for a 
newfound openness, packaged under the rubric of globalization, produced an ontological 
insecurity of a sort (of fears and anxieties that could not be named), leaving ‘us’ with the 
amorphous discourse of risk, then the ‘war on terror’ gave these fears and anxieties a home. 
Borrowing from Rasmussen (2002, 323), the attacks on the Twin Towers, in effect actualized 
risk and, indeed, Risk Society. Through the attacks emerged Risk Society’s inhabitants - as 
‘victims’ of the dark side of globalization. 
Indeed, Amoore (2007) has described how programs such as the American Highway 
Watch Program, which was re-invigorated and extended in the aftermath of 9/11 – “[moving] 
from the reporting of accidents, crashes and incidents during or after the event…to the post 
9/11 pre-emption of terrorist attack before the event” - work, under the auspices of 
precautionary risk, in ways that far from defending borders that already exist, participate in 
the making of those borders (216). Like risk itself, Amoore demonstrates that the appeal of 
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this program (to ‘report suspicious activity’) presumes some basis for distinguishing between 
those who are under threat and those who threaten – i.e., inside and outside, who and what 
looks a bit foreign: “In this sense, the identity of a ‘we’ is realized – whether patriotic truck 
drivers, or ‘we’ the nation, or ‘we the people’ is recognized via a claim to be able to see and 
recognize a threat” (218-219). Here again we can see the materialisation/intensification of 
borders on and through bodies and in ways that draw new lines - such that for Changez, New 
York was no longer home. What Amoore describes is a “vigilant visuality” that both 
produces and conceals white terror as animated in the popular refrain ‘Why do they hate us so 
much?’  In this section I have set out to demonstrate that whiteness/Western, rather than 
being an essential something, is, in Ahmed’s (2007, 159) words, “an effect of what coheres 
rather than the origin of coherence.”   In this case, it is an effect of the global politics of fear, 
a close cousin of the politics of anxiety/risk - the main difference being that fear has a clear 
object, whilst the object is repressed or unconscious within the terms of risk. But, this does 
not render the politics of anxiety/risk innocent of power relations. It simply obfuscates. 
 
Unknown unknowns: 
 
In what is by now perhaps the most exemplary statement of precautionary risk, 
Donald Rumsfeld delivered the following in an address to a NATO Press Conference in 
2002: 
…The message is there are no ‘knowns’. There are things that we know we 
know. There are known unknowns. That is to say there are things we now know 
we don’t know. But there are also unknown unknowns. There are things we 
don’t know we don’t know….It sounds like a riddle. It isn’t a riddle. It is a very 
serious, important matter (Quoted in Rasmussen 2004, 381). 
 
And, indeed, it is serious - especially to the extent it is taken to be so. Taken seriously, as a 
precautionary logic and basis for security thinking, Aradau and Van Munster (2007) have 
shown how the dispositif of precautionary risk has emerged as a social technology to render 
the future calculable and actionable in the present. It also demands a “vigilant visuality” 
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(Amoore, 2007) even whilst – as we have also seen in the shift in label from ‘War on Terror’ 
to ‘overseas contingency operations’ – it desists in the politics of naming. Whether or not, 
the object of fear is named, the language of risk is involved in the production of 
borders/worlds – in safety/mobility for some and restriction/confinement for others, making 
and re-making the world home for some more than others (Ahmed 2007) and in furthering 
actions, which under any other name would constitute war. As Campbell (1998, 1) has 
explained, “Danger [and here I would add ‘risk’] is not an objective condition. It does not 
exist independent of those to whom it may become a threat.” This essay’s main concern with 
contemporary theorizations of risk and the effects of risk as a framework of governance is 
that it obscures this simple fact, granting risk the status of a structural fact or an autonomous 
logic and thereby denying its appeal and, in fact, its force. 
Beck himself has said that “solidarity is based on insecurity, rather than need in the 
new modernity – i.e., that it is through the perception of shared risk that communities become 
a binding force” (Quoted in Ahmed 2004b, 72). But, despite this recognition and the 
recognition that certain “stereotypes of the ‘other’... are reactivated in the framework of risk” 
(Aradau, Lobo-Guerrero and Van Munster 2008, 151), the language of risk allows it to forget 
its own participation in the (re)mapping of imperialist landscapes and, indeed, in the 
constitution of ‘the West’ as a force in global politics that was and still is “partially shaped 
through contrasts forged in the politics and language of race” (Stoler 1995, 5). Following 
Stoler (1995) and other postcolonial scholars, the aim of this project has been to trouble a 
story of World Risk Society that has, in effect, “bracketed histories of ‘the West’” – allowing 
us to imagine something called a ‘Western consciousness’ forged independently of its 
externalized others (5). 
It has been argued that the discipline of IR has effectively erased the working of racial 
difference and “racism as a force” (Robert Vitalis quoted in Sajed 2013, 180). Perhaps 
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nowhere is this more evident than in the literature on risk. Here we can see how theory 
works according to what Fredric Jameson has called a “strategy of containment” – “a process 
that ‘allows what can be thought to seem internally coherent in its own terms, while 
repressing the unthinkable…which lies beyond its boundaries’” (Quoted in Krishna 2001, 
406). Perhaps, even more to the point, Jameson describes a strategy of containment as: 
a means at once of denying those intolerable contradictions that lie hidden 
beneath the social surface, as intolerable as that Necessity that gives rise to 
relations of domination in human society, and of constructing on the very ground 
cleared by such denial a substitute truth that renders existence at least partly 
bearable (Quoted in Krishna 2001, 406). 
 
Within risk’s own terms, Western wars (specifically, according to Aradau and Van Munster 
[2007, 105], the ‘war on terror’ and consequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq) can be situated 
outside of the framework of militarism and all it connotes including fear, desire, and 
gratifying violence. War is situated within an economy of logic rather than desire. 
This is a strategy of containment at work – what Sankaran Krishna (2001) has referred 
to as the work of abstraction in International Relations.  Without denying that whilst 
necessary to “[make] knowledge practices possible in the first place,” Krishna reminds us that 
“abstraction is never innocent of power”:  “the precise strategies and methods of abstraction 
in each instance decide what aspects of a limitless reality are brought into focus and what 
aspects are, literally, left out of the picture” (403). Once again, we could say, borrowing  
from Krishna’s critique of international law, “race serves as the silent epistemic absence that 
‘presences’ Europe [as ‘the ultimate repository of civilization’, not to mention reason, 
rationality, transcendence]’ and, by extension ‘The West’” (411). The aim of this paper has 
been to disassemble not only the understanding of ‘Western consciousness’ that underwrites 
risk, but, more specifically an understanding of a dispositif of precautionary risk outside of 
the historical contexts within which [it] emerged, the purposes [it] was meant to 
serve, the interests [it was] furthering, the specific purposes [it was] 
simultaneously dispossessing and empowering, and the acts of epistemic and 
physical violence it set in motion (Krishna 2001, 410). 
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In other words, the aim has been to introduce a new story of risk – one in which risk as 
consciousness and risk as logic do not emerge as separate from the bodies that animate and 
are (re)produced through them. Told thus, and taking Foucault’s (2003, 15) understanding of 
politics as “war by other means,” we might be more apt to reverse the formulation above and 
situate risk within a framework of war – as war. This would allow us to read Rumsfeld’s 
quote above more clearly for what it is and in the context of a truly ‘global’ politics: less a 
statement of risk than a call to unending war. 
 
Conclusion: 
 
When asked about the somewhat unusual format of the novel, The Reluctant 
Fundamentalist, which has the Pakistani telling story to an American whose voice is never 
heard (such that all we know of him is what is reflected in Changez’s observations and 
responses), Hamid says this: 
The form of the novel…allowed me to mirror the mutual suspicion with which 
American and Pakistan (or the Muslim world) look at one another. The Pakistani 
narrator wonders: Is this just a normal guy or is he a killer out to get me? The 
American man who is his audience wonders the same. And this allows the novel 
to inhabit the interior emotional world much like the exterior political world in 
which it will be read (Quoted in Harcourt Books). 
 
Hamid describes the format as “an invitation” (Harcourt Books). Indeed, as mentioned 
earlier, the reader is literally situated in the seat of the American such that Changez is talking 
to us; we are his audience. Of this, Hamid says, “[i]f the reader accepts [the invitation], then 
he or she will be called to judge the novel’s outcome and shape its ending” which is 
described as purposefully ambiguous and one that reflects back the reader’s own view of the 
world (Harcourt Books). Hence, the spatial demarcation between the two men, the terms in 
which they were presented to each other, could be reaffirmed or could collapse: “Depending 
on how the reader views the world…the reader can see the novel as thriller or as an encounter 
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between two rather odd gentlemen” (Harcourt Books). In a very real sense, the novel 
performed a Rorschach test: what we saw was what we got in the end. 
Sajed (2013), echoing Said (1993) amongst others, has written that statecraft occurs in 
many places – not simply in the speeches of world leaders and policy documents and not 
simply at border crossings. Throughout this article I have pointed to various sites where 
statecraft occurs – in fiction, in academic texts, in popular culture and in and through 
individual bodies and daily exchanges, in the myriad of intimate and sometimes even 
unconscious processes involved in subject formation which are also/always processes of 
world making. For Hamid, our frameworks of vision matter. We could imagine the relation 
between his two central characters in one of many ways; our vision would shape the story and 
ultimately the book’s outcome. Similarly, I will suggest here that if we can re-envision new 
possibilities of subject formation – and/or if there are certain things we cannot envision any 
longer (if it is the world and stories of risk presented to us that are beyond belief) – then we 
can tell new stories. We can envision different endings, new alignments and new forms of 
global politics.  It was 21 years ago that Cynthia Enloe (1996, 186) first wrote that what 
struck her as so “unrealistic” about formal analyses of international relations was “how far 
[such analyses] are willing to go in underestimating the amounts and varieties of power it 
takes to form and sustain any given set of relationships between states.” Substitute ‘people’ 
for ‘states’ to capture the new reality of ‘overseas contingency operations’ and it strikes me 
that this critique is just as applicable today. 
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